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Pret ace 
An examination of t h e  pa t t e rn  of U.S. space and defense expanditures i n  
Although these  recent  years r evea l s  some indica t ions  of o f f s e t t i n g  changes. 
o f f s e t t i n g  movements may not necessar i ly  be i n t e n t i o n a l ,  an  ana lys i s  may be 
he lp fu l  i n  evaluating the  f u t u r e  outlook f o r  space budgets. 
For example, during 1963 and 1964, slawdowns or reductions i n  defense 
spending were accompanied by rap id  increases i n  the  NASA program. Conversely, 
t h e  cu r ren t  r a p i d  Viet Nam expansion in t h e  defense budget coincides wi th  t h e  
a t  least temporary ces sa t ion  i n  the  s o w t h  of t he  c i v i l i a n  space program and in 
some reduct ions  i n  its expenditure leve l .  
Hence, t h e  present study of t h e  Federal  Budget and the  Outlook for  
Defense Spending may provide some use fu l  perspective.  The study ind ica t e s  
t h a t ,  bar r ing  another fundamental esca la t ion  i n  the  level of U.S. m i l i t a r y  
spending in V i e t  Nan, t h e  major portion of t h e  impact on the  economy of t h e  
cu r ren t  defense buildup already has been f e l t .  Hence, it would appear t h a t  
t he  i n f l a t i o n a r y  pressures accompanying the  expansion i n  defense spending 
may subside during the  coming year and t h a t  oppor tuni t ies  f o r  expanding 
Fede ra l  non-def ense spending programs may appear oilce again. 
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.economy ; 
s e c u r i t y  
w i t h  war 
t o  the  1 
That perennial whipping boy of economic analys is  -- the proverb ia l  man- 
in - the-s t ree t  -- seems t o  be r i g h t  once again. 
been contending t h a t  Federal f i s c a l  p o l i c y  has been one o f  r e s t r a i n t  i n  recent 
periods and t h a t  the i n f l a t i o n a r y  pressures have ar isen  i n  good measure i n  the 
p r i v a t e  sector, espec ia l l y  from rapid expansion i n  business c a p i t a l  invest -  
ment. I n  contrast ,  j u s t  t r y  asking our wandering pedestr ian what i s  causing 
the  present i n f l a t i o n .  The odds a re  he w i l l  r ep l y  t o  the  e f f e c t  t h a t  "Don't 
yau knw t h a t  there's a w a r  on, buddy?" This papcr says t h a t  he i s  r i g h t ,  
and has proper ly ,  although i n t u i t i v e l y ,  analyzed the cur ren t  economic im-  
pact  of the Federal Budget. 
Sophist icated economists have 
Sme perspGctivc m y  be helpful.. I n  a sense the United States i s  
engaged i n  a war; but, we do not  have a war economy. Ours i s  t r u l y  a mixed 
we a re  l i t e r a l l y  concerned wi th soc ia l  s e c u r i t y  as we l l  as na t iona l  
We do not  have the cont ro ls  or  runaway i n f l a t i o n  o f t e n  associated 
time experiences. Yet, we do f i n d  an economy pressing very c lose ly  
m i t s  o f  ava i l ab le  capaci ty and we are  making choices somewhat anal- 
ogous t o  guns versus b u t t e r  but not  q u i t e  so. I n  a sense, we are  choosing 
bo th  more guns and more bu t te r ,  However, we a re  a lso  choosing less p r i v a t e  
housing and fewer automobiles wh i l e  we a re  vo t i ng  f o r  more urban redevelop- 
ment and add i t i ona l  p u b l i c  t ranspor ta t ion  -- thus simultaneously increasing 
t a r y  and c i v i l i a n  por t ions  of  the p u b l i c  sector  i n  both r e l a t i v e  
senses. 
r s t  examine the  impact o f  the  V ie t  Nam m i l i t a r y  bu i ldup on t h e  
whole and on the Bederal Budget; subsequently, I w i l l  i nd i ca te  
the  e f f e c t s  on various types o f  companies and regions and then hazard a few 
both t h e  m i i  
and absolute 
Le t  us f 
economy as a 
- 1 /  1 w ish  t o  express my appreciat ion t o  Mr. Kenneth Galchus, my research 
a s s i s t a n t ,  f o r  born tne usuai ne ip fu i  work ana f o r  man iu i i y  repor t ing  nega- 
t i v e  f i nd ings .  I have a l s o  benefi ted from discussions w i t h  Harold Barnett, 
K e i t h  Carlson, W i  11 iam Chartener, and Hy Minsky. 
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p ro jec t ions  . 
The Timinq o f  the Impact: A Macro Viewpoint 
The esca la t ion  i n  the  U. S. commitment i n  V ie t  Nam can, t o  some extent ,  
be t rans la ted  i n t o  economic impact by look ing a t  the changing pace o f  m i l i -  
t a r y  demand. As a benchmark, l e t  us  r e c a l l  t ha t  i n  the  f i s c a l  year ending 
June 30, 1965, t o t a l  cont racts  placed, orders l e t  and o ther  "obl igat ions" 
incurred by the  Department of  Defense were a shade over $50 b i l l i o n .  I use 
the concept of ob l i ga t i ons  because i t  i s  a generic term, inc lud ing  both 
government p a y r o l l s  and contracts  w i th  p r i v a t e  f i rms. I n  the January 1966 
budget, i t  was estimated tha t  t h i s  ra te o f  making new commitments would r i s e  
t o  we l l  over $63 b i l l i o n  i n  f i s c a l  year 1966. Ac tua l l y ,  the January budget 
underestimated the r i s e  i n  m i l i t a r y  demand dur ing the  f i s c a l  year which was 
then i n  progress. 
The actual  amount of new ob l iga t ions  incurred dur ing the past f i s c a l  
year was 
i n  1965. 
same pe r  
1 ead i ng 
somewhat i n  excess o f  $67 b i l l i o n ,  o r  f u l l y  one- th i rd  greater than 
Actual expenditures increased a t  on l y  h a l f  tha t  ra te  dur ing the 
od -- 16* percent. In other words, ob l i ga t i ons  i s  the  sens i t i ve  o r  
ndicator. Unfortunately from the viewpoint of analyzing business 
condi t ions,  the supposedly most sophist icated measure o f  government f inance, 
the so-cal led na t iona l  income accounts budget,uses a concept t h a t  even lags 
behind expenditures -- the  del i very  o f  completed m i  1 i t a r y  equipment.2' To 
compound the  problem, the na t iona l  income accounts budget p icks  up government 
revenues on an accrual basis, which precedes the  actual  receipt  o f  cash by 
the  government. (See Figure 1) 
On previous accasions, I have t r i e d  t o  p o i n t  ou t  t ha t  the impact on em- 
ployment, production, and income of a m i l i t a r y  bui ldup may occur p r i m a r i l y  
- 2/See my "The I n f l a t i o n a r y  Impact o f  the Federal Budget," F inanc ia l  Analysts 
J ~ r n a ! ~  July-August 1966, ana rne souices c i t e d  there  fnr de ta i l ed  analys is  
of t h i s  po in t .  The ex ten t  t o  which d e l i v e r i e s  i a g  expeiidit i ires i s  sh.c?%!? 
g r a p h i c a l l y  i n  Wi l l i am H. Chartener, The Outlook f o r  Defense Spendins -- How 
Great an Uncertainty?,  a paper presented before the  Annual Meeting of the 
American S t a t i s t i c a l  Assn., Los Angeles, Ca l i f . ,  August 18, 1966. 
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a t  the p o i n t  i n  time tha t  budget recommendations are made, increased appro- 
p r i a t i o n s  are enacted, and orders placed w i t h  m i  1 i t a r y  contractors.  
t h i s  may appear q u i t e  obvious t o  those acquainted w i t h  defense indus t r ies ,  
the statement of Federal receipts  and expenditures on na t iona l  income account 
confinesthe measurement t o  the actual  de l i ve ry  o f  completed weapons and other  
m i  1 i t a r y  "hard goods.tt A considerable per iod  o f  t ime o f t e n  elapses between 
budget recommendations f o r  m i  1 i t a r y  procurement and del i ve ry  o f  the completed 
items t o  the  government and payment therefore, The primary e f f e c t  on produc- 
t i v e  a c t i v i t y ,  t o  the w t e n t  there i s  any, normally occurs i n  advance of the 
actual  government expenditures. Under most c i  rcurnstances, the p lac ing  o f  
orders induces p r i v a t e  product ion on government account and such product ion 
remains i n  the p r i v a t e  sector and does no t  show up as government expenditures 
u n t i l  i t  i s  completed and the goods involved del ivered t o  the p u b l i c  sector. 
A1 though 
Conceptually, product ion on government order i s  not  re f l ec ted  i n  government 
purchases of  goods and services a t  the t ime the work i s  performed. This ac- 
t i v i t y ,  as measured by the cost incurred, i s  cu r ren t l y  ncluded, i n  the gross 
na t iona l  product, i n  the change i n  business inventor ies When the government 
cont rac tor  de l i ve rs  the f i n i shed  i t e m s ,  the  t ransact ion shows up i n  the 
na t iona l  income accounts as a dec l ine i n  business inventor ies.  
I t i s  a l s o  then recorded as a government purchase of  goods and services. 
These two en t r i es  tend t o  cancel each o ther  out,  w i t h  no net  e f f e c t  on GNP. 
A t  the  t ime i t  i s  recorded i n  the nat ional  income accounts, the government 
purchase does not  represent payments t o  the factors  o f  production; i t  i s  more 
i n  the  nature o f  an i n te rsec to ra l  t rans fer  --  a reimbursement t o  the government 
con t rac to r  f o r  h i s  out lays dur ing e a r l i e r  periods. 
I t  i s  a t  the order  stage tha t  the government ac t i on  normal ly w i l l  have i t s  
i n i t i a l  and o f ten  major impact on the markets f o r  labor, raw mater ia ls ,  and 
financial resources. The con t r i bu t i on  to  erenomlc a c t I v I t y  i s  made dur ing the 
produc t ion  per iod  p r i o r  t o  the actual government ''purchase.'' Indeed, the re- 
cord ing  of the government purchase may co inc ide i n  time w i t h  a reduct ion i n  
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governmental impact on t o t a l  demand and i n  repayment o f  working c a p i t a l  loans 
by the government contractors. 
This may seem l i k e  a s t a t i s t i c a l  tempest i n  a teapDt (o r  a crackpot). 
However, the  upshot i s  t h a t  the o f f i c i a l  budget and economic repor ts  a re  very 
slow t o  p i c k  up the expansionary impact o f  the V i e t  Nam buildup, but very 
quick t o  take account o f  the  de f la t ionary  impact o f  the revenue speedup. The 
ne t  r e s u l t  i s  t h a t  the Federal Government appears t o  have been f o l l o w i n g  a 
non- in f l a t i ona ry  economic p o l i c y  i n  1966 when a c t u a l l y  i t  has been a major 
source of i n f l a t i o n a r y  pressure in  the American economy dur ing the pas t  year. 
I s h a l l  t r y  t o  present some s t a t i s t i c a l  support f o r  t ha t  statement. 
In  Table 1, I have assembled a f e w  va r ia t i ons  on a theme, the theme being 
the  ne t  Federal surplus o r  d e f i c i t  i n  recent periods. On the f a r  l e f t ,  I have 
placed the o f f i c i a l l y  reported surplus or d e f i c i t  i n  the so-cal led na t iona l  
income accounts budget. This, we are repeatedly t o l d  from on high, i s  "our 
best measure of the economic impact of f i s c a l  po l  icy." On tha t  basis, the  
Federal budget s h i f t e d  from a p o s i t  on of ease i n  the second h a l f  o f  calendar 
1965 (a d e f i c i t  o f  $1.4 b i l l i o n )  t o  some r e s t r a i n t  i n  the f i r s t  h a l f  o f  1966 
(a surplus of $3.1 b i l l i o n ) .  
Now I s h a l l  t r y  t o  muddy the waters. The next  two columns on t h a t  t ab le  
conta in  two a l t e r n a t i v e  sets  o f  rough adjustments f o r  the f a c t  t ha t  new con- 
t r a c t s  awarded may be a b e t t e r  proxy f o r  the impact o f  a m i l i t a r y  bu i ldup 
on the  economy thar! d e l i v e r y  o f  completed weapons. 
t he  excess o f  m i  1 i t a r y  ob1 iga t ions  over expenditures dur ing the period, 
seasonally adjusted and converted t o  an annual basis. 
been made. Over the years, about two t o  th ree  b i l l i o n s  d o l l a r s  worth of 
o b l i g a t i o n s  each year do no t  seem t o  r e s u l t  i n  actual  expenditures. A number 
o f  techn ica l  f a c t o r s  a re  a t  work here, inc lud ing  some double counting of con- 
t r= ;c ts  awarded by ORE! m i !  I t z r y  agency i n  behalf o f  another m i l  i t a r y  agency. 
Such a case might be A i r  Force procurement o f  a i r c r a f t  f o r  the Army, which may 
The A ser ies  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  
One f u r t h e r  change has 
TABLE I 
, Ca 1 enda r 
Yea r 
1964 
* 1st Half 
2nd Half 
1965 
1st Half 
2nd Half 
Federal Surplus or Deficit: Some Variations on the 
National Income Accounts Dudqet 
(billions of dollars at annual rates) 
1566 est i mated 
1st Half 
2nd Half 
Federal Surplus (+) 
or deficit (-) 
--official bas is  
-4.3 
-1.8 
-A. 4 
-1.4 
-!-3. 1 
0 
Adjustments 
for defense 
obliqations 
D - A - 
-0.1 -0.1 
-4.4 -2.2 
-2.0 -1 .o 
-5.2 -2.6 
-8.4 -4.2 
- ?  - ?  
Fede ra 1 Su rp 1 us (4s) 
or deficit (-) 
--adiusted b a s i s  
B - A - 
-h,4 "4.4 
-6.2 -4.0 
+2.4 +3.4 
-6.6 -4.0 
-5.3 -1.1 
- ?  - ?  
- 5 -  
show up as an Army ob l igac ion  t o  the A i r  Force, as we l l  as an A i r  Force ob1 i -  
ga t ion  t o  the a i rp lane  manufacturer. 
ser ies,  the  annual o b l i g a t i o n  f igures were reduced by 5 3  b i l l i o n  i n  each case 
t o  take account of the double counting. My i n t e n t ,  of course, i s  t o  e r r  on 
the  conservative side. 
It can be seen, r e f e r r i n g  t o  the A column on the r i g h t  hand s ide  of Table I, 
tha t  ad jus t i ng  f o r  defense ob l iga t ions  r e s u l t s  i n  some s i g n i f i c a n t  changes i n  
the  I tbest l t  measure of Federal f i s c a l  impact. The second h a l f  o f  1965 i s  now 
seen t o  be a pe r iod  of much more substant ia l  ease in  the  Federal budget than 
shown on the  o f f i c i a l  basis. O f  greater i n te res t ,  o f  course, i s  the ind ica-  
t i o n  t h a t  the  f i r s t  h a l f  o f  1966 was r o t  a per iod  o f  f i s c a l  r e s t r a i n t  but a l so  
one w i t h  a subs tan t ia l  excess of outgo over income. 
In  computing both the A and B adjustment 
The B adjustment i s  an attempt t o  s a t i s f y  the more t imid. I t  i s  a s t a t i s -  
t i c a l  compromise between the two approaches, the r e s u l t  o f  an a r i t hmet i c  av- 
eraging of m i l i t a r y  ob1 iga t ions  and expenditures f o r  each period. 
t heo re t i ca l  r a t i o n a l e  t h a t  could be o f fe red  i s  t ha t  perhaps a more proper 
counterpart  t o  the  1 i ab i  1 i t y  bas is  of the corporate revenue computations would 
be somewhere between the  extremes o f  con t rac t  placement and governmental d i s -  
bu rsemen t. 
The 
As would be expected, the B resu l ts  a re  somewhat more moderate than the  
A ser ies.  The adjusted Federal d e f i c i t  f o r  the l a t t e r  p a r t  o f  1965 i s  ra ther  
large, but, on t h i s  basis, the f i r s t  h s l f  o f  1966 witnessed a d e f i c i t  o f  sorne- 
what reduced proport ions. I would suggest t h a t  even the  B ser ies  provides a 
very weak case f o r  the widely made c la im tha t  f i s c a l  r e s t r a i n t  occurred dur ing 
January-June 1966. 
Ano t he r Korea? 
It has been fashionable t o  compare the  V i e t  Nam bui ldup w i t h  the Korean 
experiences i n  the h q r J  that_ c ~ m e  pirs!!e!c weu!c! pre\:Ic!p, 2 f i rms? basis f e r  
f o r e c a s t i n g  purposes. However, important d i f fe rences  need t o  be acknowledged, 
although they tend t o  balance each other out. 
The f i r s t  set  o f  d i f ferences re la tes t o  the smal ler  r e l a t i v e  scale o f  the 
present buildup. 
t o  3,200,000 seems modest indeed when compared t o  the spur t  from 13 m i  11  ion  
i n  1950 t o  over 34 m i l l i o n  i n  1952. 
The current  expansion o f  the  armed farces from 2,700,000 
Also, the defense budget doubled dur ing the 
f i r s t  year o f  the Korean War, whi le,  as noted, the increase dur ing the past 
year was about 16 percent. A l l  t h i s  r e f l e c t s  the f a c t  t ha t  t h i s  i s  the f i r s t  
t ime t h a t  the Uni ted States has entered a major war w i t h  a very la rge  e x i s t -  
ing  defense establishment. 
The second set  of d i f ferences re la tes t o  the f a c t  tha t ,  u n l i k e  Korea o r  
World War I I ,  the present m i l i t a r y  bui ldup was superimposed on an economy 
which was rap id l y  approaching f u l l  employment, Using June 1950 and Ju ly  1965 
as the  respect ive beginning points ,  we f i n d  tha t  unemployment was h igher  i n  
the  e a r l i e r  per iod (5.4% versus 4.5%) and the operat ing r a t e  o f  indust ry  was 
lower (80% versus 90%). 
Summing these two c o n f l i c t i n g  tendencies, we may conclude t h a t  even though 
the cur ren t  defense program u t i l i z e s  a smal ler  f r a c t i o n  o f  the na t ion 's  
resources, i t  i s  more i n  the nature o f  -.. but c e r t a i n l y  not e n t i r e l y  -- 
displacement of c i v i l i a n  demand rather  than r e s u l t i n g  i n  a t o t a l  add i t i on  t o  
actual  product ion o f  goods and services. Hence, i n  the absence o f  d i r e c t  
con t ro l s  over mater ia ls ,  wages, and pr ices ,  i t  would be expected tha t  in -  
f l a t i o n a r y  pressures would accompany the  rap id  s h i f t  o f  resources from 
c i v i l i a n  t o  m i l i t a r y  use. 
The Korean e x p e r i e x e  showed that  the strongest i n f l a t i o n a r y  pressures 
occurred dur ing tha t  f i r s t  year o f  the  bui ldup, w h i l e  the economy was i n i t i -  
a l l y  ad jus t ing  t o  the new leve l  o f  m i l i t a r y  demand. 
spending a few years l a t e r  occurred s h o r t l y  before the onset o f  recession.- 
The actual  peak i n  defense 
3 /  
f/ !!. L. Weidenbaum, "The Economic iiiipart sf the Gnvernment Spending 
Process," Un ive rs i t y  o f  Houston Business Review, Spiifig ?96! , pp 3-4?. 
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If there i s  any lesson t o  be gained from the Korean experience, i t  i s  t h a t  we 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  need t o  understand the t iming o f  the impact o f  the d i f f e r e n t  
stages o f  a defense bui ldup (and subsequent cutback). 
ourselves f i g h t i n g  yesterday's i n f l a t i o n  w i t h  a tax  increase tha t  w i l l  com- 
pound tomorrow's recess i onary problems. 
The Chanqinq Nix:  A Micro ViewDoint 
Otherwise we can f i n d  
Important changes a l so  are tak ing p lace w i t h i n  the m i l i t a r y  budget. Such 
s h i f t s  i n  i t s  composition are af fect ing the extent  t o  which d i f f e r e n t  indust  ies  
and teglons are participating In the defense program. 
these developments i s  analyzing the changing "product mix" o f  m i l i t a r y  spend ng. 
The fundamental change i s  the s h i f t  of emphasis away from developing and 
The key t o  understand ng 
mainta in ing i n  being the po ten t i a l  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  deal w i t h  hypothet ical  world- 
wide o r  general-war s i t ua t i ons  and towards operat ing a m i  1 i t a r y  establ ishment 
a c t u a l l y  waging a d i f f i c u l t  but  l i m i t e d  w a r  whose dimensions keep on evolving. 
Table 2 shows the  extent  t o  which funds f o r  U. S. combat forces have been 
s h i f t i n g  from general war t o  l i m i t e d  war programs as the co ld  war has heated up. 
I t  i s  s t r i k i n g  t o  note tha t  general war forces now receive h a l f  o f  the share 
of the m i l i t a r y  budget t h a t  they received a few years ago. 
However, a more de ta i l ed  breakdown o f  the m i l i t a r y  budget i s  needed i n  order  
t o  get a t  the questions o f  regional and company impacts o f  t h i s  fundamental 
budget change. 
(on an ob l iga t ions  basis). Three major s h i f t s  are tak ing place: ( 1 )  a more 
than doubl ing i n  the share o f  the budget going t o  tanks, weapons, ammunition 
and s i m i l a r  conventional b a t t l e f i e l d  ordnance, (2) a massive reduct ion i n  the 
r e l a t i v e  as we l l  as absolute importance of miss i les ,  and (3) the reor ien ta-  
t ion of the m i l i t a r y  a i r c r a f t  budget away from long-range s t r a t e g i c  bombers 
and t o  t a c t i c a l  a i r c r a f t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  supersonic f i g h t e r s  and hel icopters .  
m e  i a t t e r  po in t ,  of  course, eiiiei-ges I--- I I --- r n 7 ; n . n  e t  ,,= the detai ! s  of the 
budgetary reports. 
Table 3 shows the s h i f t i n g  product mix o f  m i l i t a r y  procurement 
-_ 
In  general, the mi  1 i t a r y  budget i s  look ing much more 1 i ke 
TABLE 2 
Category of 
Combat forces 
U.S. C l i l i t a r y  Budqet: General versus L imi ted War 
(Total  ob l i ga t i ona l  au thor i ty ;  d o l l a r  amounts i n  b i l l i o n s )  
General \Jar Capabi 1 i t y  
St ra teg ic  e f fens i ve  forces 
Cold War 
(F isca l  Year 1962) 
Amount Percent 
V ie t  lJam 
(F isca l  Year 1966) 
Amount Percent 
$ 5.1 (13.1) 
Cont inental  a i r  and m i s s i l e  
defense forces 2.3 (7.7) 1.7 (4.4) 
Sub t o t a l  11.2 37.5 6 . 8  17.5 
L imi ted  War Capab i l i t y  
General purpose forces 17.5 (58.5) 30.0 (76.9) 
A i  r l  i f t  and s e a l i f t  1.2 (4.0) 2.2 (5 .61  
Sub t o  t a  1 18.7 62.5 32.2 82.5 
29.9 100.0 39.0 100.0 TO TAL- 
1 /  
- 1 /  The remainder o f  the m i l i t a r y  budget i s  devoted t o  support of the 
combat forces, research and development, m i  1 i t a r y  assistance, and 
r e t i  red pay. 
I -  
.. . TA.ELE 3 
The Chanqi nq Product 4 i x  of Hi 1 i t a r y  Pu rchas i nq 
( d o l l a r  amounts i n  b i  11 ions) 
Korean War Cold \Jar V ie t  NaE 
P rocu remen t (Fiscal  Year 1952) (Fiscal  Year 1962) F isca l  Year 1966) 
Ca teqory Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent 
Soohist icated Equipment 
A! r c r a f  t $ 13.1 43.5 $ 6.4 27.1 $ 8.6 29.9 
Miss i l es  .4 1.3 4.7 19.9 2.1 7.3 
Elect  ron i  cs 1.3 4.2 1.5 6.4 1.5 5.2 
Research and 
Development 1.5 5.0 5.7 24.2 7.2 25.0- 
Subtotal 16.3 54.0 18.3 77.6 19.4 67.4 
Conventional Equipment 
Ships 
0 rdnance 
0 the r 
I .a 5.8 2.2 9.5 1.1 3.8 
9.2 30.4 2.3 9.6 6.4 22.2 
2.9 9. a .8 3.3 1.9 6.6 
Sub t o  t a  1 13.9 46.0 5.3 22.4 9.4 32.6 
TOTAL $ 30.2 100.0 $ 23.6 100.0 $ 28.8 100.0 
0 
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i t  d i d  dur ing the Korean War and less than 
co ld  war conf ron ta t ion  w i t h  the  Russians. 
Hence, we are wi tnessing a reversal o f  
purchasing i n  the mid-1950's. Once again, 
dur ing the more recent per iod  o f  
the s h i f t  t ha t  occurred i n  defense 
the automotive, mechanical, t e x t i l e ,  
c lo th ing ,  and rubber companies are becoming important suppliers o f  war mater ia l .  
The most dramatic increases have occurred i n  ammunition (up 270% dur ing the 
past  f i s c a l  year), c l o t h i n g  and t e x t i l e s  (up 240%), tanks and vehic les (up 80%))) 
and food (up 60%). 
s i g n i f i c a n t  defense contractors ,  are f i nd ing  t h e i r  shares of  the m i l i t a r y  matket 
t o  be dec l in ing.  Un l ike  the per iod  of la rge  weapon systems -- such as ICBM's  
which could on l y  be suppl ied by a few o f  the i n d u s t r i a l  g iants  -- the demands 
of V ie t  Nam r e s u l t  i n  numerous smaller cont racts  invo lv ing  a great  many and 
v a r i e t y  o f  medium-size f i rrns as defense suppl iers.  
The la rge  aerospace and e lec t ron i cs  f i rms,  although s t i l l  
There i s  a l s o  a geographic dimension t o  t h i s  change i n  the  m i l i t a r y  pro-  
duct m i x .  Large propor t ions of the companies working on V ie t  Nam orders are 
located i n  the Upper Midwest and i n  other r e l a t i v e l y  o lde r  i n d u s t r i a l  s ta tes 
i n  the East. 
defense orders dur ing the past decade, i s  experiencing some absolute as we l l  
as r e l a t i v e  decl ines. Table 4 shows the  h i g h l i g h t s  o f  these changes. 
The Far Vest, which had been receiv ing so large a share of 
Several s ta tes have been receiv ing defense contracts  a t  rates of  40 t o  50 
percent above l a s t  year 's leve ls ,  These inc lude Connecticut, I l l i n o i s ,  Indiana, 
i jary land, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. In contrast ,  
Washington State, Utah, and Colorado have seen t h e i r  defense contracts  v i r t u -  
a l l y  c u t  i n  h a l f  dur ing the past two years. C a l i f o r n i a  i s  now a t  the 1963 
leve l ,  despi te  the subs tan t ia l  growth i n  the ove ra l l  m i l i t a r y  market which 
has occurred s ince then. 
The economic impacts o f  t h i s  s h i f t  i n  the l oca t i on  o f  defense indust ry  
may nct he 3s slmp!a as would appear. 
d i v e r s i f i e d  i n d u s t r i a l  bases and these recent increases i n  t h e i r  defense 
The midwestern s t a t e s  have :Ziry^S, we??-  
TABLE 4 
Census 
Reg i on 
The Chanqinq Geoqraphic D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  Oefense Contracts 
(Percentage d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  d o l l a r  volume) 
Korean War Cold War V ie t  Nam 
(F isca l  Year 1952) (F isca l  Year 1962) (Fiscal Year 1966) 
Northeast 
New England 8.1 10.9 11.9 
Middle A t l a n t i c  25.1 18.7 17.6 
Su bto  t a  1 33.2 29.6 29.5 
N i dwes t 
East North Central 27.4 12.6 15.3 
West North Central 6.8 6.7 7.6 
Sub t o t a  1 34.2 19.3 22.9 
South 
I__ 
South A t l a n t i c  7.6 10.4 12.5 
South Central 6.4 7.8 12.2 
Sub to t  a 1 14.0 18.2 24.7 
Far West 
Moun t a  i n .7 4 . 7  2.5 
P a c i f i c  17.9 28.2 20.4 
Subtotal __ 18.6 32.9 22.9 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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orders, although dramatic, may be taken i n  s t r i d e  as they w i l l  requi re  re la -  
t i v e l y  small propor t ions o f  e x i s t i n g  manufacturing capacity. 
hand, defense work i n  recent years has accounted f o r  a p ropor t ionate ly  large 
On the other  
share o f  the t o t a l  manufacturing employment o f  many western s tates and i n  
several cases f o r  v i r t u a l l y  a l l  the growth o f  such employment i n  the major 
metropol i tan areas. 
espec ia l l y  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  those western s tates tha t  are not p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  
the simultaneous expansion i n  the  commercial a i  r c r a f t  market. 
The adjustment t o  the changing m i l i t a r y  market may be 
On balance, I would expect t ha t  the reo r ien ta t i on  of defense spending toward 
greater  emphasis on l i m i t e d  war equipment, which seems l i k e l y  t o  o u t l a s t  the 
cur ren t  Wiet Nam bui ldup, w i l l  have important d i f f e r e n t i a l  e f f e c t s  on the 
r e l a t i v e  rates o f  growth in  populat ion, income, and tax bases i n  the var ious 
regions o f  the country -- e f f e c t s  which should p r i m a r i l y  be favorable t o  the 
Middle A t l a n t i c ,  Great Lakes, and New England areas. 
The Outlook f o r  1967: W i l l  F isca l  Res t ra in t  Be Bigger on the Ins ide  
than on the Outside? 
And now t o  my cloudy c r y s t a l  ba l l .  Ord inar i l y ,  the Federal Government would 
have issued by now a Hidyear Review o f  the Budget, updating the estimates 
publ ished l a s t  January. Very impressive reasons a re  given f o r  the lack of  a 
Midyear Review. As I reca l l ,  a d i f f e r e n t  set  of  excuses were made l a s t  year. 
As a sometime forecaster ,  I w i l l  read i l y  agree tha t  i t  i s  always more com- 
f o r t a b l e  not  t o  have t o  s t i c k  your neck out. 
Hence, the task a t  hand f o r  us i s  t o  i n f e r  f u t u r e  developments from the 
most recent data. I t  i s  almost a s i t u a t i o n  o f  const ruct ing a case based s o l e l y  
on c i rcumstant ia l  evidence. Let us begin by analyzing the  pa t te rn  of  m i l i t a r y  
buying dur ing the past year, the f i s c a l  year ending June 30, 1966 -- which i s  
the  l a t e s t  per iod  f o r  which data are p u b l i c l y  avai lable.  Because o f  the unique 
seasonal pa t te rn  o f  m i l i t a r y  order ing and the absence of a seasonal adjustment 
f o r  e a r l i e r  periods, i t  i s  useful  to compare the data f o r  a give2 querter  w i t h  
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the corresponding per iod i n  previous years. Beginning w i t h  the July-September 
quar ter  o f  1965, we f i n d  tha t  m i l i t a r y  ob l iga t ions  dur ing each o f  the past  
four  quarters were the highest f o r  that respect ive per iod  s ince the peak de- 
mands of the Korean \Jar i n  1952. 
In  add i t ion ,  each recent quar te r  has been h igher  than the preceding quarter,  
w i t h  the  greatest  spur t  occurr ing dur ing Apr i l -June 1966. 
o l d  tendency t o  concentrate Federal commitments i n  the f i n a l  quar ter  of the 
f i s c a l  year (so-called 14hne buying"), not  too much can be read i n t o  the l a s t  
quar ter  of data. However, i t  does seem q u i t e  c l e a r  tha t  the upsurge of 
defense orders i s not  running out of steam. 
Because of  the age- 
The lead time between order ing tanks, ammunition and s i m i l a r  conventional 
l i m i t e d  war equipment i s  l i k e l y  t o  be less than i s  the case f o r  ICBN's, space 
systems, and o ther  h i g h l y  sophis t icated aerospace products. Hence, the ac- 
ce le ra t i on  i n  defense buying i n  f i s c a l  1966 already has been t rans la ted  i n t o  
a $4 b i  11 ion  annual r a t e  of increase i n  defense purchases o f  goods and services 
i n  the July-September quar te r  and l i k e l y  i n t o  another $3-$4 b i l l i o n  increase i n  
the cur ren t  October-December quarter. 
ha l f  o f  f i s c a l  1967. 
These estimates account f o r  the f i r s t  
Here, t h i s  Swami's c r y s t a l  b a l l  begins t o  c loud up and you need t o  put  some 
co in  i n  h i s  palm i n  order  t o  ob ta in  a forecast f o r  the calendar year 1967. 
Hopeful ly,  the f i n e  p r i n t  on t h a t  coin should conta in  the m i l i t a r y  o b l i g a t i o n  
r a t e  f o r  the past quar te r  and estimates f o r  the next quar ter  o r  so. There i s  
l i t t l e  advantage t o  going back to  the January budget; as we l a t e r  learned, on ly  
some t ime a f t e r  the dccument was released, i t  was based on the o p t i m i s t i c  as- 
sumption tha t  the war soon would be over, We are r e a l l y  on our own. 
a l t e r n a t i v e  pro jec t ions  of defense spending i n  1967 seem t o  be fashionable these 
days. 
Two 
The f i r s t ,  a Newtonian o r  Dow Theory approach, says tha t  the cur ren t  
v n C q  
incresse Ir! defe=t?se nutlays w i l l  continue cnrough l p l  -- t h z  retlzns!e being 
t h a t  i f  the war continues then the m i l i t a r y  bui ldup w i l l  need t o  continue. 
- 1 1 -  
The second or Accelerat ion P r inc ip le  approach ind icates tha t  defense spend- 
ing should taper o f f  i n  the l a s t  h a l f  o f  1967, even i f  the  V ie t  Nam f i g h t i n g  
continues a t  i t s  present pace, but o f  course ba r r i ng  snother large-scale esca- 
la t ion .  
a t ta ins  the desired speed -- i n  the present case, the new product ion l i n e s  
should already have been pu t  i n  place and quant i t y  product ion rates achieved 
e a r l y  i n  1967. Also, t o  the extent  that  some of  the recent order ing has been 
The idea here i s  t h a t  you can l e t  up on the gas pedal a f t e r  the veh ic le  
designed t o  restock m i l i t a r y  inventor ies,  new order ing can taper  o f f  as appro- 
p r i a t e  stock leve ls ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s o f t  goods, are reached. 
approach i s  somewhat more sophist icated, I tend t o  lean toward i t, but w i t h  
l i m i t e d  confidence. 
op t  i m i  s t i c. 
Because t h i s  second 
The assumption of no f u r t h e r  m i l i t a r y  escalat ion may be too 
One view tha t  I do ho ld  w i t h  greater firmness may be consis tent  w i t h  both 
of these a l te rna t i ves  and tha t  i s  that  the major shock t o  the American economy 
from the V i e t  Nam bui ldup already has occurred. 
the  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  Federal defense purchases reaching a t o t a l  o f  $70 b i l l i o n  i n  
1967, a r i s e  of  40 percent from 1965. Barr ing a fundamental escalat ion,  i t  i s  
u n l i k e l y  tha t  the coming year w i l l  witness the 33-1/3 percent increase i n  
defense orders tha t  occurred l a s t  year. 
demand-pull nature which we have been experiencing dur ing the past year a re  
1 i k e l y  t o  subside somewhat, but the cost-push i n f l a t i o n a r y  pressures are 1 i ke ly  
t o  continue. 
This statement i s  made despi te 
Hence, the i n f l a t i o n a r y  pressures of a 
To m o l l i f y  those who an t i c ipa te  a p r o j e c t i o n  of the  Federal Budget, Table 
No doubt 5 i s  o f fered,  probably as a s a c r i f i c e  on the a l t a r  o f  convention. 
i t  should be kept out o f  the reach o f  ch i l d ren  and appropr ia te ly  labeled as to 
i t s  poss ib ly  being i n ju r i ous  t o  the heal th ,  f i n a n c i a l  i n  t h i s  case, 
seen t h a t  I am p ro jec t i ng  a r e l a t i v e l y  small surplus i n  the statement o f  Federal 
rece ip ts  and expenditures ir! the nat ional  income accounts i n  ca:endsr year !966 
and approximate balance i n  1967 -- on the o f f i c i a l  basis, I have used poe t i c  
I t  can be 
TABLE 5 
Federal Receipts and Expenditures in  the National Income Accounts 
(In b i l l i o n s  o f  do l la rs )  
Surplus (c) 
Calendar Year Receipts Expend i t u  res o r  D e f i c i t  (-1 
1958 78.7 88.9 -10.2 
1959 29.7 91.0 - 1.2 
1960 96.5 93.0 + 3.5 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
93.3 
106.4 
114.5 
115.1 
102.1 
110.3 
113.9 
118.1 
- 3.3 
- 3 .8  
-:- 7 
- 3.0 
1365 124.9 123.4 -I- 1 . 6 
1966 est imate 143.0 140.0 -:- 3 . 0 
1967 est imate 158.0 158.0 --- 
Note: See Table 1 f o r  poss ib le  adjustments 
to  the expenditure and su rp lus /de f i c i t  
f igures.  
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l icense i n  l abe l i ng  these guesses as "estimates." 
A few comments on the d e t a i l s  of the pro jec t ions  may be .n  order. On the 
revenue side, I have attempted t o  take account o f  the scheduled cont inuat ion  
of the speedup i n  the payment of the  corporate income tax. 
the cur ren t  year, large corporat ions are paying about 116 percent o f  t h e i r  
normal annual 1 i ab i  1 i t y  (42 percent o f  t he i  r 1965 1 i a b i  1 i t y  and 74 percent of 
t h e i r  1966 l i a b i l i t y ) .  
paying approximately 126 percent of normal annual l i a b i l i t y  ( the remaing 26 
percent o f  t h e i r  1966 l i a b i l i t y  p lus  103 percerlt sf t h e i r  1967 l i a b i l i t y ) .  
For example, i n  
In  1967, the speedup continues, w i t h  these companies 
Thus, 
they w i l l  be on a 
On the  expend 
var ious Great SOC 
ments and grants- 
por t ions  o f  these 
Fede r a  1 pu rchases 
and v i r t u a l l y  a l l  
4/ pay-as-you-go basis f o r  the calendar year 1968 as a whole.- 
t u r e  side, the bulk of the recent ly  enacted increases i n  the 
e t y  programs i s  re f l ec ted  p r i m a r i l y  i n  r i s i n g  t rans fe r  pay- 
n-a id  t o  s ta te  and loca l  governments. Re la t i ve l y  small pro- 
education, housing, and ant i -pover ty  programs r e s u l t  i n  
of  goods and services. The greater  p a r t  o f  these purchases 
o f  the recent increases are i n  connection w i t h  m i  1 i ta ry  and 
re la ted  na t iona l  secu r i t y  programs. 
On the face o f  i t , i t  would appear tha t  the t rend i s  f o r  a s l i g h t  reduct ion 
i n  Federal f i s c a l  r e s t r a i n t  i n  1967. As you must know by now, I do no t  be l ieve  
t h a t  i t  w i l l  work q u i t e  tha t  way. 
f o r  defense ob l iga t ions ,  I be l ieve  tha t  the resu l t s  would be a Federal d e f i c i t  
I f we had the data t o  p ro jec t  the adjustment 
on income and product account in  1966 and a smal ler  d e f i c i t  i n  i967 ,  thus 
i n d i c a t i n g  an abatement i n  the i n f l a t i o n a r y  pressures d i r e c t l y  r e s u l t i n g  from 
the V i e t  Nam buildup. 
Deal i n s  w i t h  I n f l a t i o n  
Some important p o l i c y  impl icat ions f l o w  from a l l  th is .  A general tax 
increase tak ing  e f f e c t  some t ime i n  1967 may be too l a t e  eo deal e f f e c t i v e l y  
- 4/ Hence, c e t e r i s  parabus, a reduction i n  Federal corporate income tax receipts  
may occur i n  1968. 
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w i t h  the i n f l a t i o n a r y  pressures of the V ie t  ?am bui ldup and of  l i m i t e d  use- 
fu lness i n  dampening a wage-price o r  cost-push i n f l a t i o n  
inc ide  w i t h  some of  the belated impacts of t h i s  year 's t 
espec ia l l y  i n  i t s  e f f e c t  on business investment." Thus 
might r e l i e v e  g u i l t  fee l ings  f o r  not having enacted one 
confession o f  e r r o r  might be more helpfu l .  
I t  might a lso  co- 
ght monetary po l  i cy ,  
a tax increase now 
n January, but  mere 
Given the continued speedup of Federal revenue co l l ec t i ons ,  assuming t h a t  
our diagnosis o f  the economic impact o f  defense spending i s  approximately 
cor rec t ,  and given the softness o r  slowing diiwn i n  many p r i v a t e  areas of  
demand, 1967 may be the year tha t  -- one way o r  another --they lower the boom. 
I /  Cf. John Kareken and Robert PI. Solow, "Lags i n  Monetary Pol icy :  A Summary," 
i n  Warren L. S m i t n  and kona:d ?. T e I ~ e n ,  ed i to rs .  Leadinqs i n  I.loney, National 
7 L  Qn Income and S t a b i l i z a t i o n  Pol icy ,  i y o ~ ,  pp I U S ~ ~ .  . r l , -  
